

## Mounted Troops.

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The real value of mounted soldiers in an army is little understood. General Scott's opinion of the armed horsemen has not been hastily formed. It is drawn from long experience, acute observation, and is fortified by the opinions of such men as Napoleon I., Napoleon III., Marshal Sout, Sir William Napier and Marshal McMahan. It amounts simply to this—that, while a certain small proportion of mounted troops is almost indispensable in a campaign, cavalry are the least useful, the most troublesome, the hardest to manage, and the most expensive part of an army. The United States regular service has now a maximum of 7,000 mounted men; and over one thousand not mounted. Of the regulars even, one half are now mounted on untrained steeds, which are unmanageable and dangerous in line of battle.

When mounted soldiers meet each other in the fray, as they do in nearly all modern engagements, their power is gone. The fighting is confined to the few companies in front. Retreating and charging perpetually is their work in the line. As an outside contingent they are good; and we have a sufficient supply for this. All modern battles establish the absurdity of putting cavalry against cavalry. Napoleon is about to lessen his mounted men by thirteen thousand; and the Duke of Tetuan (Marshal O'Donnell) has made artillerists of his best three cavalry corps. One thousand footmen can do twice as much military business as one thousand horsemen. When a trooper loses his steed, "he is as helpless as a disarmed musketeer." Dismounted he is half defeated; and a horse is a bigger target than a man

One regiment of dragoons costs twice as much as four other regiments. One thousand horses cost one hundred thousand dollars at least. Their support, which is a small item in the additional expenditures they incur, costs two hundred thousand dollars a year. The general unsuitability of the arms of mounted troops, for infantry work—the extra camp provisions, the tons of implements that must be carried after a mounted force, and the ambulances this would require—the partial character of their usefulness—the fact that every military nation has discovered their comparative worthlessness—and that men can be employed much more advantageously as artillerists, infantry, riflemen, and